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THE DOUBLE STANDARD OF JUSTICE:
WOMEN'S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
MARY EASTWOOD*
INTRODUCTION
Women frequently are subjected to different rules than are men,
in the law as well as socially. There are still some federal and state laws
that either treat men and women differently or apply only to one sex.'
Government agencies sometimes administer laws designed to protect
women from sex discrimination differently than those designed to protect
blacks from racial discrimination Courts not only have approved laws
distinguishing between men and women but generally have used a
* Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author. They are not presented as the views of the Department
of Justice or any other government agency or official body.
1. Sex distinctions in laws and official practices have been documented elsewhere.
See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1969); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE
STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOMEN (1963); U.S. DE"T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S
BUREAU, 1969 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS (1969); CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW AND POLICY
(1968); P. MURRAY, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN STATUTES ON QUALIFICATIONS, EXEMP-
TIONS, AND EXCUSES OF JURORS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO WOMEN (1966).
2. One such example is the failure of the Federal Communications Commission to
require station licensees to report their positive action programs for equal employment
opportunity for women while requiring such reports of programs with respect to
Negroes, American Indians, Spanish-Surnamed Americans and Orientals. Nondiscrim-
ination Broadcast Practices, 23 F.C.C.2d 430 (1970). See also 35 Fed. Reg. 8825 (1970)
where the FCC announced that its major enforcement efforts would be with regard to
employment of those groups (and not women). The National Organization for Women
(NOW) has petitioned the Commission to amend its report forms so as to include posi-
tive action programs for women. F.C.C. No. RM-1722, filed December 4, 1970. Similarly,
regulations of the Department of Labor issued under Executive Order No. 11246 of
September 24, 1965, as amended, concerning nondiscrimination in employment under
government contracts require affirmative action programs to eliminate discrimination
against minority groups. 35 Fed. Reg. 2568 (1970). In response to questions as to the ap-
plicability to affirmative programs for the employment of women, the Secretary of
Labor stated he had "no intention of applying literally exactly the same approach to
women in Order 4 [35 Fed. Reg. 2568 (1970)] which was designed for racial minori-
ties." Washington Post, July 27, 1970, § B, at 1, col. 1. The Labor Department's Wash-
ington Plan of affirmative action programs for federally involved construction contracts
also excludes women. 35 Fed. Reg. 19352 (1970). See also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, A MATER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE, 18-26 (1970).
Early interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. (1964), by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission made clear
that that agency did not at the time regard sex discrimination important. For example,
the EEOC specifically allowed sex discrimination in job advertising. 30 Fed. Reg. 14928
(1965) ; 31 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1966). But-see the current rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4 (1970),
discussed in Fuentes, Federal Remedial Sanctions: Focus on Title VII, 5 VAL. U.L. REv.
374 (1971).
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different criterion for determining whether constitutional protections
against sex discrimination have been violated than is used with respect
to racial discrimination. Thus, a double standard of justice is applied
to the classes of men and women and the classes of women and blacks.
The failure of the courts to interpret the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments3 as prohibit-
ing discrimination against women in the law has caused women to seek
adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment: "Equality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of sex." 4 The single purpose of the proposed amend-
ment is to require the equal treatment of men and women under the law
and to restrain the courts from applying different rules to women under
the Constitution. The problem of sex discrimination does not lie in any
limited scope of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to protect women
from discrimination in the law, but from the refusal of the courts to
regard women as fully human "persons" under these amendments.5 As
Representative Martha Griffiths explained on August 10, 1970, the first
time in the 47 year history of the Equal Rights Amendment that it passed
the House of Representatives :6
There never was a time when decisions of the Supreme Court
could not have done everything we ask today. . . .The Court
has held for 98 years that women, as a class, are not entitled to
equal protection of the laws. They are not "persons" within
the meaning of the Constitution."
Advocates of equal rights for men and women regard proper inter-
pretation of the existing constitutional protections against sex discrim-
ination as meaning the same as the Equal Rights Amendment. This
position was first stated by the President's Commission on the Status
of Women in 1963:
Equality of rights under the law for all persons, male or
female, is so basic to democracy and its commitment to the
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V prohibits the federal government from depriving any
person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV similarly prohibits the state governments from denying due process to any person
and prohibits the denial "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
4. S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
5. Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title
VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 238 (1965).
6. H.J. Res. 264, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reported at 116 CONG. REc. H7984-85
(daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970).
7. Id. at H7953.
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ultimate value of the individual that it must be reflected in the
fundamental law of the land. The Commission believes that
this principle of equality is embodied in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.8
For this reason, the Commission concluded that an additional amend-
ment was not at that time needed, "[b]ut judicial clarification is im-
perative in order that remaining ambiguities with respect to the con-
stitutional protection of women's rights be eliminated." 9
This article first sets forth the judicial standards that have been
applied with respect to sex discrimination cases under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, as compared to other types of class discrimina-
tion cases, and secondly, analyzes the effect the Equal Rights Amendment
would have upon existing differences in treatment of men and women in
the law.
UNEQUAL PROTECTION
Constitutional Tests for Class Distinctions
Two standards have been developed by the courts to determine
whether laws differentiating between classes of persons violate con-
stitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws.'" One such standard
is that the law is valid if the class distinction is based upon some "reason-
able" ground. The other is that the class distinction is constitutional only
if it is shown that the government has a "compelling interest" in making
the class distinction. The reasonableness test has generally been applied
with respect to laws treating women as inferiors or restricting their
liberties. The stricter compelling state interest test has been applied with
respect to racial classifications and situations involving fundamental
constitutionally protected liberties." There is, however, an additional
distinction between the two standards: the burden is upon the person
challenging a law to show that it is unreasonable; the burden is upon
the state to show that it has a compelling interest.
The more lax reasonableness standard applied by the courts in
equal protection cases is that the classification must be based on "some
8. PRESIrNT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOMEN 44
(1963).
9. Id. at 45.
10. The fifth amendment due process clause imposes restrictions on the federal
government against discriminatory class legislation comparable to restrictions imposed
on the states by the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
11. For an analysis of constitutional standards under the equal protection clause
see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
1971]
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difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted
classification-and not a mere arbitrary selection."' 2 Under the stricter
standard, the mere showing of some rational basis for the classification
is not sufficient to support its constitutionality. Racial classifications are
subject to the stricter test since "[a]ll legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect and
. . . courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."'" Thus, in
holding unconstitutional Virginia's anti-miscegenation law, the Supreme
Court found "no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious
racial discrimination" to justify the classification." The showing of an
overriding and compelling state interest is also required where the law
affects fundamental individual liberties, such as freedom of religion,9
freedom of association,"6 and the right to travel, 7 to vote,18 to have
offspring19 and to assert familial relationship.2"
Classifying Persons by Sex
The 98 years of inequality under the fourteenth amendment men-
tioned by Representative Griffiths2 dates back to the 1872 Supreme
Court decision in Bradwell v. Illinois" which upheld the refusal of the
Supreme Court of Illinois to admit women to practice law. Three of the
United States Supreme Court justices based their decision in part on
religion:
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which
is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood....
...The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to
12. Gulf, C. & S. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165-66 (1897). See also McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954);
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
13. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
14. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). See also McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
15. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
16. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
17. Shapiro v. Thompsoh, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
1& Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ; Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
19. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1962).
20. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
21. See note 7supra and accompanying text.
22. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
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fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is
the law of the Creator. 3
That woman's place is ordained to be in the home is one of several
assumptions that the courts have relied upon as justifying laws dis-
criminating against women. The other assumptions are related to
"woman's place" and are only slightly more sophisticated. They are, in
essence:
1. Since women are the only humans who can give birth, they
are reproductive instruments who may be specially restricted, protected
or controlled by the law in the interest of preserving the race.
2. Since women have special responsibilities in homemaking (house-
keeping) and child rearing, and men do not have such responsibilities,
women's rights as citizens outside the home may be curtailed to allow
them to do their home chores.
3. Since women as a class are generally inferior to men in physical
strength, it is assumed that a woman has less endurance and must be
limited in her activities outside the home to save her strength.
4. In some situations women (but not men) are a danger to
morality and need to be supervised by men.
5. Men are in power; they have established their control, and it
should stay that way.
As will be shown, the courts have relied on either one or a combination
of these rationales in cases upholding laws distinguishing on the basis
of sex, and frequently they are no more subtly stated than as set forth
above.
The Brandwell case was decided under the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment rather than under the due process
or equal protection clauses. Two years later, the Supreme Court held
in Minor v. Happersett24 that the privileges and immunities clause did
not confer on women citizens the right to vote. However, the Court
stated specifically that "[w]omen and children are . . . 'persons' )
under the Constitution" and reasoned that "[i]f the right of suffrage
were one of the necessary privileges of a citizen of the United States,
then the Constitution and laws of Missouri confining it to men [would
be] in violation of the Constitution of the United States."2 "
The rule that the law may properly single out women for special
23. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). See also In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116
(1894).
24. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
25. Id. at 174.
26. Id. at 170.
1971]
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treatment was developed in connection with the enactment of special
restrictions on the employment of women around the turn of the
century." Laws restricting the hours of work of both men and women
were held violative of the fourteenth amendment due process right to
liberty of contract for employment in Lochner v. New York.28 In Muller
v. Oregon,2" the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an Oregon
maximum hours law that applied only to women,"0 distinguishing it
from Lochner on that ground:
Differentiated . . . from the other sex, she is properly placed
in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection
may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary
for men and could not be sustained. It is impossible to close
one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and
depends upon him."'
Since hours legislation for both sexes was upheld in 1917 in Bunting v.
Oregon,2 the utility of the doctrine that sex is a reasonable basis
for legislative classification in upholding the constitutionality of labor
standards legislation was short-lived. The theory of legitimacy of sex
differentiation, however, became entrenched in the law. 8
The justification in Muller for special restrictions applicable to
women was, in essence, that women are inferior to men in physical
endurance and that, since women are instruments of reproduction of the
race, the state has a special interest in protecting their health. Thus,
the Court stated:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle
for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the
burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not,
by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance
for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from day
to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy
27. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908).
28. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
29. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
30. See also Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236
U.S. 385 (1915); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914), cases upholding hours
restrictions for women employees.
31. 208 U.S. at 422.
32. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
33. For summaries of selected cases involving sex discrimination, see PREsInENr'S
COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE CIVIL AND POLITIcAL RIGHTS
COMMITTEE, Appendix B (1963).
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mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-
being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care
in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race."
The constitutionality of night work restrictions85 and special minimum
wage laws3" for women was also upheld.
In Truax v. Raich" the Supreme Court stated that the right to
work in legitimate occupations without discrimination on grounds of
race or nationality "is of the very essence of the personal freedom and
opportunity that it was the purpose of the 14th Amendment to secure.""
In that case, an Arizona law requiring employers to employ not less
than 80 percent native-born citizens was held violative of the fourteenth
amendment rights of an Austrian cook. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,9 a
San Francisco ordinance administered to deny Chinese the right to
operate laundries was found to be an unconstitutional denial of the right
to learn a living. Similarly, in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Com-
mission4 0 a California statute forbidding issuance of commecial fishing
licenses to aliens ineligible for citizenship was held to be violative of the
rights of aliens to the equal protection of the laws.
However, in the same year as Takahashi, the Supreme Court ruled
in Goesaert v. Cleary"' that a Michigan statute forbidding the licensing
of any female to act as a bartender unless she is the wife or daughter
of the male owner was not violative of the fourteenth amendment,
justifying the discrimination primarily on moral grounds:
The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that
men have long claimed as their prerogative and now indulge in
vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the
States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes, certainly
in such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic. 2
Bartending by women may "give rise to moral and social problems."4 "
The fact that Michigan permitted women to serve as (lower paid)
waitresses where liquor was dispensed was not thought by the Court to be
34. 208 U.S. at 421.
35. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
36. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 397 (1937).
37. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
38. Id. at 41.
39. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
40. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
41. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
42. Id. at 466.
43. Id.
1971]
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inconsistent inasmuch as there the "man's ownership provides control.""
Control over women is proper, but the kind of restriction in Yick Wo
(natural origin) was characterized as "the essence of slavery itself."' 5
The validity of a Chicago ordinance prohibiting employment of
women bartenders was recently challenged. The ordinance was similar
to the law found constitutional in Goesaert except that female licensees
as well as male licensees and their female relatives were exempt from
the restriction. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in reversing
the district court's dismissal of the case, stated that the additional
exemption for female licensees might make the ordinance distinguishable
from Goesaert in that the justification of masculine control was not
present. Where there is a female licensee involved, "there would be no
protective male in the background." 4 On remand, the district court held
the ordinance void on its face as denying women property rights without
due process of law." A New Jersey court recently found it unnecessary
to pursue the constitutional question raised in Goesaert, finding simply
that a prohibition on women working as bartenders served no public
purpose." The legality of special drinking places for men has also been
successfully attacked by women. 9
The moral danger of mixing women and liquor appears to have
subsided. But "the woman's place is in the home" theme continues. As
recently as 1961, the Supreme Court in Hoyt v. Florida" upheld the
constitutionality of a Florida statute providing that no female be selected
for jury service unless she has registered with the clerk of the circuit
court her desire to be placed on the jury list:
Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the re-
strictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into
many parts of community life formerly considered to be re-
served to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home
and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally im-
permissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare,
44. Id. at 467.
45. 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
46. McCrirnmon v. Daley, 418 F2d 366 (7th Cir. 1966).
47. McCrimmon v. Daley, 2 F.E.P. Cas. 971 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
48. Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57
N.J. 180, 270 A.2d 628 (1970). See also Wilson v. Hacker, 200 Misc- 124, 101 N.Y.S2d
461 (Sup. Ct. 1950), where a New York court held that a bartenders union demand that
women bartenders be excluded was unlawful.
49. Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). For a discussion of discrimination against women in public accommodations, see
Seidenberg, The Federal Bar v. The Ale Houwse Bar: Women and Public Accomoda-
tions, 5 VAL. U.L. Rxv. 318 Rxv. 318 (1971).
50. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
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to conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic
duty of jury service unless she herself determines that such
service is consistent with her own special responsibilities."
Women have "special responsibilities" in homemaking and child rearing,
but the "housewife and mother" role is an occupation not protected by
labor standards legislation. A housewife has no legal right to claim
wages, only room and board (support), and even that, as a practical
matter, is largely dependent on the sufferance of her husband. The fact
that the work in many situations can be pleasant is irrelevant. It is labor
with no legal right to remuneration, and it is foisted upon women as
their proper function-to serve not only their husbands, but also, by
rearing children, society.
Because women are legally recognized as a particular kind of servant
class, the denial of equal civic rights such as jury service is regarded as
justified. This concept does not represent a fair arrangement between
the sexes; it is a dual discrimination against women. It has even been
asserted that the special responsibilities of mothers may justify dis-
crimination against women in employment under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 2
A more enlightened view of women's rights is reflected in the 1966
three-judge federal court decision of White v. Crook,"3 which held an
Alabama statute barring women from jury duty unconstitutional. The
court unequivocally applied the fourteenth amendment stating:
The Constitution of the United States must be read as embody-
ing general principles meant to govern society and the institu-
tions of government as they evolve through time. It is there-
fore this Court's function to apply the Constitution as a living
document to the legal cases and controversies of contemporary
society ....
. . . The Alabama statute that denies women the right to
serve on juries . . .violates that provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States that
forbids any state to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
51. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
52. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971). For an analysis of this
case, see Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of
Law for Women, 5 VA.L. U.L. REv. 326 (1971). See also Fuentes supra note 2; Note,
The Mandate of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: To Treat Women as Indi-
viduals, 59 GF.o. L.J. 221, 232-39 (1970).
53. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
54. Id. at 408.
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the equal protection of the laws." The plain effect of this
constitutional provision is to prohibit prejudicial disparities
before the law. This means prejudicial disparities for all cit-
izens-including women."
Similarly, in a fifth amendment case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed a conviction because the trial
judge had dismissed women jurors from the panel on the ground that
evidence in the case would require testimony concerning cancer of the
male genitals:
It is common knowledge that society no longer coddles women
from the very real and sometimes brutal facts of life. Women,
moreover, do not seek such oblivion....
The District Judge's desire to avoid embarrassment to the
women jurors is understandable and commendable but such
sentiments must be subordinated to constitutional or congres-
sional mandates.5
The reasoning in White v. Crook was rejected in a recent Mississippi
decision :56
The legislature has the right to exclude women so they may
continue their services as mothers, wives, and homemakers,
and also to protect them (in some areas, they are still upon a
pedestal) from the filth, obscenity, and noxious atmosphere
that so often pervades a courtroom during a jury trial.17
Mississippi, however, no longer excludes women from jury service.5"
Courts have also held that women are entitled to equal treatment in
the penalties they are subject to for conviction of crimes. This progress,
of course, affects comparatively few women. As of December 31, 1967,
only 3.2 percent of the sentenced prisoners in federal and state institutions
were women.
60
55. Abbot v. Mines, 411 F.2d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 1969).
56. State v. Hall, 187 So. 2d 861 (Miss.), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 98 (1966).
57. Id. at 863 (emphasis added).
58. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1762 (Supp. 1968).
59. Longer prison terms for women than for men convicted of the same crimes
have been declared unconstitutional. United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F.
Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) ; Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
See also Morgan v. State, 179 Ind. 300, 101 N.E. 6 (1913) ; State v. Walker, 326 Mo.
1233,34 S.W.2d 124 (1930).
60. U.S. DF'T OF JusTIcE, PRIsONEaS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR
ADULT FELONS 1967, at 10 (1969). On March 15, 1970, five percent of the adult prisoners
confined in county and city jails were women. U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTIcE, 1970 NATIONAL
JAIL CENSUS 1 (1971).
290
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In Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,"
a federal court held that the exclusion of women-plaintiffs from the
University of Virginia at Charlottesville "denied their constitutional
right to an education equal with that offered men at Charlottesville and
that such discrimination on the basis of sex violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 2
However, in other recent cases approving sex discrimination in
computing social security benefits and in imposing obligations for
military service, courts have harped back to woman's physical weakness
and her "place" in the home as supplying justification for the difference
in treatment. Thus, in finding beneficial treatment of women in com-
puting amounts of retirement benefits constitutionally valid, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the objective of the dif-
ference was "to reduce the disparity between the economic and physical
capabilities of a man and a woman. "63 There is some logic in the
reference to the economic inferiority of women workers, but the reference
to "physical capabilities" of retired male and female workers would seem
to cut the other way since women live longer, i.e., are physically stronger,
not weaker. Even if it were possible to balance out discriminations
against men and women by sex, giving benefits to one sex in one area
and to the other in a different area, there is no certainty that the perfect
balance between the classes of men and women would result in individual
justice which presumably is the goal. Only the elimination of sex dis-
tinctions in the law can accomplish this.
In United States v. St. Clair,"4 involving a challenge under the
fifth amendment to the constitutionality of the Military Selective Service
Act of 1967,6" the court stated:
In providing for involuntary service for men and voluntary
service for women, Congress followed the teachings of history
61. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
62. Id. at 189. But see Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd
mere., 91 S. Ct. 976 (1971) ; Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.), appeal
dismissed & cert. denied, 364 U.S. 517 (1960), rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 944 (1961) ;
Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), appeal dismissed & cert. denied,
359 U.S. 230, rehearing denied, 359 U.S. 999 (1959). For an analysis of sex separation in
public schools as sex discrimination, see Barnett, The Constitutionality of Sex Separation
in School Desegregation Plans, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 296, 311-17 (1970).
63. Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982
(1968).
64. 291 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also United States v. Cook, 311 F.
Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
65. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451, 453 (1964).
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that if a nation is to survive, men must provide the first line of
defense while women keep the home fires burning.6"
Military service, like jury service, is a right and obligation of
citizenship. The Supreme Court has stated that "the duty of citizens by
force of arms to defend our government against all enemies whenever
necessity arises is a fundamental principle of the Constitution." '
Similiarly, in White v. Crook, the Court stated that "jury service is
a form of participation in the processes of government, a responsibility
and right that should be shared by all citizens, regardless of sex."68
White v. Crook and United States v. St. Clair are distinguishable. In
the former case, the Alabama law totally excluded women from jury
service, whereas in St. Clair women were not totally excluded from
military service and could volunteer.6" In addition, women challenged
their exclusion from the jury law in White v. Crook, whereas the attack
on the Military Selective Service Act was made by a man, but it is not
likely that it would have made any difference if it had been a woman in
view of the Court's nostalgic view of women keeping the home fires
burning.
Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Commission
Perhaps the most extreme example of applying a double standard
of justice to women is the district court decision in Mengelkoch v.
Industrial Welfare Commission."0 The case challenged the constitu-
tionality under the fourteenth amendment 'and the consistency with
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"' of California's maximum
hours law for women."2 The suit was a class action brought by employees
of North American Aviation, Inc. (now North American Rockwell
Corporation). The women sought an injunction against the California
Industrial Welfare Commission to prevent enforcement of the hours
restriction, alleging that the effect of the law was to deny women the
opportunity to work at higher paid and supervisory jobs that might
66. 291 F. Supp. at 124-25.
67. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). The case involved the ex-
clusion of a 49 year old woman pacifist under the immigration laws because of her re-
fusal to bear arms. The court noted that despite her own ineligibility for military service
by reason of age and sex she might influence others.
68. 251 F. Supp. 401, 408 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
69. 291 F. Supp. 122, 125. Cf. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
70. 284 F. Supp. 950, 956 (C.D. Cal.), vacated, 393 U.S. 83, rehearing denied, 393
U.S. 993 (1968), rev'd & remanded, 437 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1971).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
72. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1350 (West Supp. 1971).
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occasionally require overtime work and to deny them additional premium
overtime pay.
The complaint was filed in October, 1966. A three-judge court was
convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 which requires that an
action to enjoin state officials from enforcing a state law on the ground
that such law is unconstitutional be heard by a three-judge district
court. A year and a half later in May, 1968, the three-judge court dis-
solved itself, stating it lacked jurisdiction because there was no substantial
constitutional issue. Since the constitutionality of state hours restric-
tions on women had been upheld by the Supreme Court in Muller v.
Oregon" and Miller v. Wilson"4 and by the California courts in Ex
parte Miller,75 the three-judge court reasoned that the question of con-
stitutionality was foreclosed. The case was returned to a single judge
who then dismissed the case, invoking the doctrine of abstention."
Since state courts have no jurisdiction in Title VII cases (federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction)," the effect was that women simply
could not pursue their remedies under the federal statute. This would
read "sex" out of Title VII as effectively as if it were repealed. A direct
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
The court vacated the three-judge order and remanded the case for
entry of a fresh decree from which a timely appeal could be taken to the
Ninth Circuit, holding that where a three-judge court dissolves itself,
the appeal lies to the appropriate court of appeals."' The appellants
had argued that the three-judge court's dissolution after deliberating
the question for over a year in effect denied the injunction7 ' and resulted
in a decision on the merits of whether the state law was constitutional
so that a direct appeal would lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.80 The
Supreme Court, however, treated the case as one involving the threshold
question of whether a three-judge court should be convened (whether
the constitutional question was insubstantial). Threshold questions of
73. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
74. 236 U.S. 373 (1915).
75. 162 Cal. 687,127 P. 427 (1912).
76. A case challenging the constitutionality of Louisiana's hours laws was similarly
dismissed by the district court but was not appealed. Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 162,
165 (RD. La. 1968).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1964).
78. 393 U.S. 83, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 993 (1968).
79. Jurisdictional Statement at 2, Menkelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 393
U.S. 83 (1968).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 provides for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court "from an
order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent in-
junction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be
heard and determined by a district court of three judges."
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jurisdiction under the three-judge statute are appealable to the court of
appeals rather than to the Supreme Court."1
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded
the case to the three-judge court holding that a determination that
Muller and Miller require rejection of new attacks on the constitution-
ality of the hours restriction "is not so obvious and beyond reasonable
debate that the constitutional attack must be regarded as insubstantial.""2
The court of appeals opinion in Mengelktch strikes a blow at the
continued viability of Muller, noting several distinguishing factors:
1. That the relevancy and importance of some of the conditions
discussed in Muller "today may not be the same;"8
2. That in Muller the primary issue was whether restricting work
hours of women was a "wise" exercise of the police power under the due
process clause standards applied then and that the constitutional attack
was by the employer, not the women employees ;"4
3. "In Muller the statute was upheld in part because it was
thought to be a necessary way of safeguarding women's competitive
position. Here the statute is attacked on the ground that it gives male
employees an unfair economic advantage over females."85
4. By emphasizing differences of the sexes, the Supreme Court
in Muller was able to uphold the statute despite its decision in Lochner
v. New York.86 This emphasis is no longer necessary. 7
The court, however, took pains to make clear it was not pre-
judging the substantive issue of constitutionality but only showing that
the constitutional issue was not insubstantial and that the three-judge
court therefore had jurisdiction to decide the case. 8
It took from October, 1966, to January, 1971, for the federal courts
to determine that a three-judge district court has jurisdiction to hear
Mrs. Mengelkoch's complaint that the California hours restriction on
women workers violates their rights to equal protection of the laws
under the Constitution and their right to pursue remedies afforded by a
federal civil rights law. In the meantime, decisions in cases brought by
other women under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 have
81. See Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32
U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1964), for a discussion of the three-judge statute.
82. 437 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1971).
83. Id. at 566-67.
84. Id. at 567.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Set notes 27-45 supra and accompanying text.
88. 437 F.2d at 569.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
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generally established that special restrictions on women workers are
inconsistent with and superseded by that Act. 0
Sex as a Prohibited Classification
Arguments have been made in sex discrimination cases that laws
classifying persons by sex should be subjected to the stricter standard
of constitutionality as opposed to the more lax reasonableness test and
that the state should be required to show a compelling interest in the
classification." In United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 2 a federal
district court held unconstitutional a Connecticut law requiring longer
prison terms for women than for men convicted of the same crimes.
The court recognized that
[w]hile the Supreme Court has not explicitly determined
whether equal protection rights of women should be tested by
this rigid standard, it is difficult to find any reason why adult
women, as one of the specific groups that compose humanity,
should have a lesser measure of protection than a racial group."
Nevertheless, the court in dictum went out of the way to approve the
rationale of cases upholding sex classification in employment and jury
service. 4 It is doubtful that the law in question in Robinson could be
upheld under any test no matter how lax.
Even under the stricter compelling state interest standard, there
is no assurance that it would be applied to strike down legal discrimina-
tion against women in the same way as have laws discriminating on the
basis of race. Regardless of the test applied, as Professor Kanowitz
has noted, "the result will inevitably depend upon a court's visceral
rather than its cerebral behavior."95
The Supreme Court stated in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections:
[Tlhe Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political
90. See Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforce-
ment of the Law for Women, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 326 (1971); Ross, Sex Discrimination
and 'Protective' Legislation, published in Hearings on SJ. Res. 61 Before the Subconm.
on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., at 392 (1970).
91. Brief for Appellant at 14-15, Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n,
437 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1971) ; Brief for Human Rights for Women as Amicus Curiae at
18-20, Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 3 F.E.P. Cas. 130 (9th Cir. 1971) ; Brief for
Plaintiffs at 24-25, Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 309 F.
Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
92. 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
93. Id. at 14.
94. Id. at 13. The court relied upon Hoyt v. Florida, 386 U.S. 57 (1961) ; Goesaert
Iv. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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theory of a political era. In determining what lines are uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to
historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted
due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time
deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights .... Notions of
what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause do change."
It is suggested that any differentiation based on sex should no longer
be tolerated under the equal protection clause and that courts turn their
attention in a given case to the issues of whether there is a differentiation,
and, if so, whether the differentiation is based on sex. These latter
issues are discussed in connection with the interpretation of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment.
Women constitute a political class in part because the law has made
them so by treating the class differently. The fact that women are
integrated into all economic classes and that many women do not serve
the function of homemaking and childrearing has not been deemed
relevant. The entire class of women is treated differently from the class
of men for some purposes on the basis of those functions.
It is difficult to reconcile laws classifying persons by the permanent
class of their birth with the basic democratic concept that "all men are
created equal."97 Classifications that treat persons differently simply
because they were born into a class are antithetical to democracy
because the individual is permanently condemned to legal restrictions
by virtue of a status over which he or she has no control. In this respect,
sex, race, national origin and legitimacy differ from other classifica-
95. Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American
Law, 48 NEB. L. REV. 131, 142 (1968). See also Berg, Title VII: A Three-Years' View,
44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 311, 344 (1969). The concept of "benign" discrimination to make
up for past damage to a class of course would be fraught with danger if applied to
women. Recent Developments-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1104-20
(1969). Any permitted difference in treatment as between men and women is likely to
"protect" away women's liberties. It has even been suggested that discrimination against
women in employment is benign if the purpose of restricting women is for their own
"protection." Moewe, The Case for Benign Sex Discrimination, 44 Los ANGES BAR
BULL., 337, 340-41 (1969).
96. 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (emphasis in original).
97. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. The fact that the founding fathers did not
have women or blacks in niind does not negate the applicability of the principle to those
classes. It may be noted, however, that Abigail Adams had women in mind and is
quoted as writing to her husband John:
Remember: all men would be tyrants if they could .... If attention is not
paid to the ladies, we shall foment a rebellion and will not hold ourselvesi
bound by any laws in which we have no voice or representation.
LENGYEL, FOUR DAYS IN JULY 123 (1958).
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tions" For example, the age of a person changes; so might his religion,
economic status or citizenship. If classifications by birth were prohibited,
attention would shift from the question "can government discriminate
between men and women by this rule" to the question "does the rule
under attack, though superficially neutral, result in different treatment
of the sexes?"
To interpret constitutional guarantees of equal protection as pro-
hibiting all distinctions in the law based on permanent birth castes is
particularly necessary where the class that is treated differently lacks
power, as in the case of women. There are no women on the Supreme
Court. Only one of 97 United States Court of Appeal judgeships is
filled by a woman"' and only four of the 402 federal district court
judges are women. I"' Only one woman is in the Senate'.. and only 12
of 435 members of the House of Representatives are women. The
President, Vice President and the Cabinet are all males. As the Supreme
Court stated in Muller:
[Hlistory discloses the fact that woman has always been
dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset
by superior strength, and this control in various forms, with
diminishing intensity, has continued to the present.'
Masculine control (or raw power) was similarly given by the Oregon
Supreme Court as partial justification for barring women from par-
ticipating in wrestling competitions :103
We believe that we are justified in taking judicial notice of the
fact that the membership of the legislative assembly which en-
acted this statute was predominantly masculine. That fact is
important in determining what the legislature might have had
in mind with respect to this particular statute, in addition to
98. Compare Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U.L.
REv. 723 (1935). The author states that "[olnly permanent and natural classes are open
to those deep, traditional implications which become attached to classes regardless of
the actual qualities of the members of the class." Id. at 727-28. Certain mental or
physical defects may be permanent from birth, but these are conditions not classes.
Therefore, special legislation to protect them would not be forbidden under this rule.
99. Shirley Hufstedler, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
100. Sarah Hughes, Northern District of Texas; Constance Baker Motley, South-
ern District of New York; June Green, District of the District of Columbia; Cornelia
Kennedy, Eastern District of Michigan.
101. Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.
102. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
103. State v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 300 P.2d 455 (1956). The reader should not be
distracted by the subject matter of the case. It is the concept which might be applied in
any sex discrimination case that is important.
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to its concern for the public weal. It seems to us that its purpose,
although somewhat selfish in nature, stands out in the statute
like a sore thumb. Obviously it intended that there should be
at least one island on the sea of life reserved for man that
would be impregnable to the assault of woman.'"4
Men make, enforce and interpret the laws that apply to women. As a
class, women are still under the control of men and dependent, for the
most part, on male judges to define the degree of protection against
discrimination afforded by the Constitution.
Disappointed with the court's interpretations of the fourteenth
amendment, women have sought, albeit unsuccessfully, congressional
approval of the Equal Rights Amendment in the hopes that the more
restrictive language of the amendment will restrain the judiciary from
approving sex discrimination in the law. But unless women play a greater
role in all forms of government, there is no assurance that their lack of
equal status under the law will not continue indefinitely despite new con-
stitutional mandates. Although women have the ultimate political power
of the vote, suffrage has not brought about great improvement in women's
legal position. As one feminist has quipped, "If we gave the dog the
vote it wouldn't change anything." The reasons why women have not
brought themselves into self determination are what the women's libera-
tion movement basically is about.
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Language and History
For nearly a half-century women have sought congressional approval
of a constitutional amendment to guarantee equal rights under the law.
As introduced in 1923, the Equal Rights Amendment read: "Men and
women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every
place subject to its jurisdiction.""0 5 The language was partially changed
in 1943 because it was thought the above language might be interpreted
to require geographic uniformity.' Modified, the proposal read:
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex." It has since been intro-
duced in that form.1"'
When it became apparent that the amendment would not be approved
by the Senate after it had already passed the House in the 91st Congress,
104. Id. at 284, 300 P.2d at 457.
105. S.J. Res. 21, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 65 CONG. REc. 150 (1923).
106. S. Rtp. No. 267, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
107. H.J. Res. 208, S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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Senator Birch Bayh offered a substitute amendment: "Neither the
United States nor any State shall, on account of sex, deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."1 8 As
stated by Senator Bayh, the purpose of the language, which was taken
from the fourteenth amendment, was in part to "make absolutely clear
that the Congress and the country do not agree with" the implications
of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area."'u 9 Senator Bayh also
stated that his substitute proposal would "prevent the kind of restrictive
interpretation and disruptive application which the critics have feared.""'
Because the substitute was designed as a compromise and would afford
something less than absolute equality, it was not supported by the
women's movement and the amendment died a quiet death in the 91st
Congress.
Numerous hearings have been held on the Equal Rights Amendment
from 1924 to 1970.111 The Equal Rights Amendment has frequently been
reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee." 2 It passed the
Senate in 19501" and 1953,"' but it was saddled with an obviously killing
rider providing that the amendment not "be construed to impair any
rights, benefits, or exemptions now or hereafter conferred by law, upon
persons of the female sex." As noted above, it passed the House of
Representatives in 1970."'
The Equal Rights Amendment was originally introduced in 1923
at the instigation of the National Woman's Party. This organization has
been the most persistent group in continuously pressing for congressional
approval of the amendment since that time."'
108. 116 CONG. REC. S18076 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1970).
109. Id. A resolution simply expressing the sense of Congress that the right to
equal treatment under the law without differentiation based on sex is protected by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments might have been more appropriate.
110. Id.
111. See S. REP. No. 267, supra note 106, at 2, for a history of congressional hear-
ings on the Equal Rights Amendment. See also Hearings on SJ. Re,,. 61 & 231 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 1970) ; Hearings on S.I.
Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 1970); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.(1956); Hearings on Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution Relative to Equal
Rights for Men and Women Before Subcomm. No. I of the House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
112. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1558, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) ; S. REP. No. 2192,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. REP. No. 303, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. Rzp.
No. 1150, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
113. 96 CONG. R.Fc. 972-73 (1950).
114. 99 CONG. Rxc. 8954-55 (1953).
115. 116 CONG. REc. H7985 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970).
116. This persistence is not suprising in view of the origin and history of the
National Woman's Party. Its founder and honorary national chairman, Alice Paul,
1971]
Eastwood: The Double Standard of Justice: Women's Rights Under the Constitu
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
300 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
The stepped-up interest in the amendment in 1970 was probably
the result of 1) increased publicity of the women's liberation movement
in the popular press which had the effect of making the potential political
power of women felt by Congress and 2) the endorsement and support
of the amendment by two official bodies, the Citizens' Advisory Council
on the Status of Women.. 7 and the President's Task Force on Women's
Rights and Responsibilities."'
The Citizens' Advisory Council published a Memorandum on the
Proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution
in March, 1970."' The Memorandum contains a five-point analysis 2 by
which to determine the effect of the Equal Rights Amendment on
various laws differentiating on the basis of sex. An elaboration of that
analysis in light of issues raised in connection with the 1970 Senate
hearings and the debate in the 92d Congress is set forth below.
It has been asserted by opponents of the amendment that "at one
fell swoop this amendment would wipe out all those protective laws that
we, after arduous toil, sought to put on the statute books."'' It is true
that the Equal Rights Amendment would be largely self-implementing
and in "one fell swoop" would require equal treatment of men and
women under the law. But it would not wipe all the unequal laws off the
books. Some laws which apply to one sex only would be rendered
unconstitutional by the amendment; others would be extended to the
other sex.
The language of the amendment parallels that of the fifteenth and
nineteenth amendment except that those amendments refer to "[t]he
led the suffrage campaign which culminated in adoption of the nineteenth amendment.
The suffragists' tactics included peaceful demonstrations and picketing. Some of the
women who were arrested in the summer of 1917 "for obstructing traffic" were tried
and sentenced to prison. When they went on a hunger strike to protest their brutal
treatment in prison, they were painfully and forcibly fed. In an effort to break the
spirit of their leader, Miss Paul was held incommunicado in a psychopathic ward for a
week. For a history of the suffragists' experiences as political prisoners, see IRWIN,
Up HILL WITH BANNERS FLYING: THE STORY OF THE WOMAN'S PARTY 269-99 (1964).
In 1971, Alice Paul continues as the spearhead in the drive for passage of the Equal
Rights Amendment.
117. Established by Executive Order No. 11126 of November 1, 1963, 3 C.F.R. 791
(Supp. 1963), the Council consists of 20 members appointed by the President.
118. The Task Force is an ad hoc group set up in October, 1969 to review the
status of women and make recommendations to the President. See PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE (1970).
119. Reprinted at Hearings on S.I. Res. 6i Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 369-90
(1970). Representative Griffiths also had the Memorandum reprinted at 116 CONG.
Rxc. E2588 (daily ed. March 26, 1970).
120. Hearings on SJ. Res. 6r, supra note 119, at 384-86.
121. Remarks of Representative Celler, 116 CONG. REc. H7961 (daily ed. Aug. 10,
1970).
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right of citizens of the United States to vote" instead of "[e]quality of
rights under the law." Under the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments,
state voting laws were not wiped off the books; they were extended to
apply to Negroes and women, respectively.122 Instead of the right to vote,
the Equal Rights Amendment is concerned with the right to equal treat-
ment in the law without differentiation because of sex.
The five-point guide for determining the constitutionality of laws
that distinguish on the basis of sex could likewise be utilized in cases
brought under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The battle for the
Equal Rights Amendment, whether or not it ever becomes a written
part of the Constitution, may serve to encourage proper interpretation
of existing constitutional equal protection guarantees.
It is of course assumed that there is no such thing as "good
discrimination" based on sex and that complete legal equality of men and
women is desirable. If these assumptions are not valid, if it is desirable
that the law treat men and women differently, then women must be
represented in government in proportion to their population so that they
have equal power to make the laws that apply to them and to determine
when the law should be unequal.'23 The only third alternative is for
women to accept their lot as a subspecies and to be ruled by a superior
class.124
Interpretation of the Equal Rights Amendment-The 5-Point Guide
1. Laws That Confer a Benefit, Privilege or Obligation of Citizenship
on One Sex: Strike the Words of Sex Identification and Extend the
Benefit, Privilege or Obligation to Both Sexes
122. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 389 (1880): Graves v. Eubank, 205 Ala. 174,
87 So. 587, 588 (1921).
123. Proportional representation in government might be initiated by adoption of
the following constitutional amendment:
Section 1. One Senator from each state shall be a woman and the other shall be
a man. As near as may be, one half the Senators elected at each election shall
be female and the other half shall be male. The three Classes of Senators
shall be further divided into six Classes, to effectuate this Article.
Section 2. The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of not less
than one half women Judges.
Section 3. The Congress shall have power to enforce the provisions of this
Article by appropriate legislation.
124. The extreme view that women are a subspecies is expressed by the National
Socialist White People's Party (formerly the American Nazi Party) as follows:
The halls of Congress are actually ringing with the serious debate on legisla-
tion designed to make women equal. And perhaps we shouldn't be surprised at
this foolishness, because it is simply a logical extrapolation of the liberal
fantasy that all featherless bipeds are, or should be "equal," and that racial,
sexual, and other differences are nature's mistakes which can be legislated
away.
Pierce, Weekly Telephone Recording, Arlington, Va. (1970).
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(a) Protective labor laws. Minimum wage laws and laws requiring
meal periods, rest periods or seating facilities for women but not for men
workers. 2 confer a legal right on women workers. To give men equality
of rights under the amendment, any man denied such rights guaranteed
to women could invoke the amendment to extend these benefits to men.
It should be noted, however, that most minimum wage laws apply to men
as well as to women.
12 6
(b) Social security and other social benefits laws. Social security
and other types of public insurance which confer greater benefits on one
sex than the other would have to be equalized by giving the greater
benefit to both sexes. The additional cost involved is the measure of the
extent to which the law presently discriminates against one sex and gives
a special preference to the other.
One contingency for eligibility for a husband's insurance benefit
under the Social Security Act is that he must have received at least
one-half his support from his wife, but no such contingency is required
for a wife to secure benefits.'27 As a matter of the principle of equal
rights, the benefits are equalized upward; as a matter of policy, perhaps
the assumption in the law that all married women are economically
dependent on their husbands should be removed by legislation. Thus,
wives of individuals included under the Act would be subjected to the
same contingencies that are presently applied to husbands of included
individuals.
(c) Alimony. State laws that authorize courts to award alimony
only to women in effect authorize courts to confer benefits to women but
not to men."' The effect of the Equal Rights Amendment on these laws
would be to authorize award of alimony to men. As a practical matter,
alimony is sometimes awarded instead of child support so that the mother
instead of the father pays the federal income tax.'
(d) Child support. Children are legally entitled to support from
both mother and father' despite the common assumption that the father
is the breadwinner. The law pertaining to child support applies only
where there is marital dissolution. Where the marriage is intact, it does
not matter what the law says. In many families both parents contribute
125. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, .rupra note 1, at 265, 274-75.
126. Id.?at 265.
127. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 402(b) (1), 402(c) (1) (C) (1970).
128. In at least 12 states, courts may award alimony to either husband or wife.
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 1, at 287.
129. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 61, 71, 215.
130. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, RECIPROCAL STATE LEGISLATION To ENFORCE
THE SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS 20 (1964).
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to the financial support of the family. In some, the mother devotes full
time to homemaking and child care in lieu of a financial contribution.
None of these arrangements would in any way be affected by the amend-
ment.
In the case of divorce, separation or desertion, the mother is most
frequently granted, or left with, custody of the children. There is no
escape from her responsibility for providing food, shelter, medical care,
education and upbringing for her children. She must rely on the law and,
perhaps to a greater degree, on the father's goodwill for some financial
assistance for the children. Women generally bear the greater burden
of supporting and raising children and the Equal Rights Amendment,
although requiring equality of obligations, would not make that burden
heavier. It would not preclude requiring one parent to make child
support payments while the other parent makes her (or his) contribution
in the form of care and upbringing.
(e) Child custody. In a few states, the law gives the mother pre-
ference in child custody matters. 1 ' The presumption that men are not as
fit to raise the next generation is, of course, unfair.' As against third
parties seeking custody, the Equal Rights Amendment would extend
legal preferences now accorded to women to fathers as well.
(f) Divorce grounds. The same grounds for divorce are generally
available to either party to the marriage. Exceptions in some states are
"non-support" available to the wife,1" or pregnancy of the wife without
knowledge of the husband at the time of the marriage, available to the
husband.3 4 Under the amendment, the right to support from a spouse
would extend equally to both spouses; it is possible that non-support
might in some circumstances be available to the husband. However, in a
case where the wife works as housekeeper for her husband, such con-
tribution should be a defense to a divorce action brought by the husband
on non-support grounds.
131. The Women's Bureau states that at least 8 states give the mother preference
if the child is of tender years and the father preference "if the child is of an age to re-
quire education or preparation for labor or business." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S
BUREAU, supra note 1, at 287.
132. The Supreme Court has agreed to review a case challenging an Illinois law
allowing the natural mother to have custody of an illegitimate child but requiring the
natural father to either adopt or seek permission to become legal guardian of the child.
In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970), cert. granted, 91 S. Ct.584 (1971).
133. Arkansas and North Dakota allow a husband to obtain a divorce on grounds
of the wife's failure to support in certain circumstances. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202(1962); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-05-03, 14-05-07 (1960).
134. For a listing of grounds for divorce by state as of December 1, 1969, see
Steele, The Legal Status of Women in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 309, 404-05 (Council
of State Gov'ts ed. 1970).
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Where pregnancy of the wife at marriage is a grounds for divorce
by the husband, expectant paternity of the husband would be equally
available to the wife seeking divorce. Because of problems of proof, this
extension of 'divorce grounds to the wife would probably have practical
application only where the husband subsequently acknowledges his
paternity of another woman's child.13
(g) Community property control. In seven of the eight community
property states," 6 the husband has control of the community property
including property and income contributed by the wife. 37 In Texas,
however, each spouse manages and controls that community property
he or she would have owned if single. Where the property contributed
by the two spouses is mixed or combined, it is jointly controlled unless
the spouses agree to a different arrangement. 8'
Under the Equal Rights Amendment, the husband's power in the
seven other states to manage the community property would extend to
the wife as well, i.e., it would be jointly managed unless otherwise
agreed upon. The legislatures of those states could, of course, provide
for other nondiscriminatory management of community property such
as that provided in the Texas law.
(h) Inheritance rights. To the extent that sex distinctions in laws
pertaining to inheritance and administration of decedents' estates
remain, " ' the higher benefits would apply to both sexes.
In upholding the constitutionality of an Idaho statute providing
that "of several persons claiming and equally entitled to administer
[decedents' estates], males must be preferred to females,' '1 40 that state's
highest court noted that it could be argued that the law discriminated
against women on the basis of sex. The court explained, however, that
"[n]ature itself has established the distinction and this statute is not
designed to discriminate, but is only designed to alleviate the problem
of holding hearings by the court to determine eligibility to administer.' 14 1
It is doubtful that expediency should justify discrimination against
135. For an enlightened view of divorce grounds, see Goldstein & Gitter, On
Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model Statute and Commentary, 3 FAMILY L.Q.
75 (1969). See also CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW AND POLICY 34-38 (1968).
136. Property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is jointly owned, i.e.,
"community property" of the spouses in Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New
Mexico, Nevada, Texas and Washington.
137. U.S. DEp'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 1, at 290.
138. Ch. 888, § 1 [1969] Texas Laws (effective 1970).
139. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 125, at 290-92.
140. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-314 (1948).
141. Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970), prob. jwis. noted, 91 S. Ct
917 (1971).
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women. The drawing of lots and flipping of coins are also efficient
methods of decision-making and certainly preferable to the admittedly
arbitrary discrimination in the Idaho law.
(i) Consortium. In some jurisdictions, only the husband has a right
to sue for loss of consortium where his spouse is injured. Consortium
is the right to the spouse's services.142 Once lost, the wife's services have
sudden economic value--to the husband. Under the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, the right to sue for loss of consortium would be extended to the
wife in case of actionable injury to her husband.14
(j) Jury service. The Women's Bureau has summarized the state
laws on jury service as follows:
In 28 States women serve under the same terms and conditions
as men, with the same qualifications, disqualifications, and
exemptions. In 22 States and the District of Columbia, women
may be excused on grounds not available to men. Of these, 11
States permit a woman to be excused solely on the basis of
her sex. An additional 10 States . . . and Puerto Rico permit
women to claim an exemption because of child care or family
responsibilities. Rhode Island further provides that women
shall be included for jury service only when court house
facilities permit. In 1967 Florida and New Hampshire removed
their requirement that women register before they may be
considered for jury service. Louisiana is now the only state
with this requirement.'"
Since jury service is a right and obligation of citizenship, 45 the obligation
to serve imposed upon men would be extended to women. In order to
extend full rights to women, impediments to selection would be nullified
by the amendment. Preconditions that women register or that the court-
house facilities are appropriate or a rule encouraging non-service by
reason of sex would therefore be void. Excuses from jury service,
(other than excuse for being a woman) such as for hardship, child care
or family responsibilities, should be regarded as an individual privilege
142. For an analysis of the law pertaining to consortium see Kanowitz, Sex-Based
Discrimination in American Law: Law and the Married Woman, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 3,
49-50 (1967); Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in
American Law, 48 NEB. L. Rxv. 131, 143-51 (1968).
143. A property interest in another person entitling one to sue for its loss seems re-
pugnant to concepts of individual liberty and perhaps should be abolished altogether.
144. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 125, at 284. A District of
Columbia law allowing women to be excused because of sex was repealed in 1968. Pub.
L No. 90-274, § 103, 82 Stat. 62. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1862 (Supp. 1970).
145. White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
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and extended to men in like circumstances. Thus, with respect to jury
service, the goal would be equal rights to be selected and equal rights in
the excuses allowed in individual hardship cases.14
(k) Military service. The Military Selective Service Act of 1967,
as amended, makes only men liable for compulsory military service. 4 '
In the House debate on the Equal Rights Amendment on August 10,
1970, Representative Griffiths pointed out that women would under the
amendment be equally subject to the draft but "would not be required
to serve-in the Armed Forces-where they are not fitted any more
than men are required to so serve. The real effect . . .would probably
be to permit both sexes to volunteer on an equal basis, which is not now
the case."""8
Women have served in the armed forces for nearly 30 years." 9 There
are presently more than 40,000 women in military service. 5 ' In 1967
special restrictions placing a ceiling on the rank to which women in
military service could be promoted were removed, 5 ' and there are now
two women generals.1 2 Differences in treatment between men and women
in military service parallel those in civilian life. As one woman officer
stated:
[M]ilitary women have generally fallen into the same patterns
of employment that prevail in the private sector-that is, a con-
centration in the jobs traditionally classified as "women's
work" and in the lower skill/grade levels. To date, top level
management and executive positions are, for all practical pur-
poses, closed to military women except those directly involved
with women's programs. 5
The practice of discharging women who become pregnant (but not
146. This discussion relates to state juries; federal law prohibits discrimination
based on sex in federal jury servic6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1862 (Supp. 1970).
147. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451, 453 (1964). The present induction authority terminates
July 1, 1971. 50 U.S.C. App. § 467 (1964). Whether or not the authority is continued, the
draft issue cannot be avoided.
148. 116 CONG. REc. H7953 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970). See also S. REP. No. 1558,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1964).
149. Holm, Women and Future Manpower Needs, DEFENSE MANAGEMENT J.,
Winter, 1970, at 6, 10.
150. Turner, Women in Military Services, DEFENSE MANAGEMENT J., Winter,
1970, at 12.
151. Pub. L. No. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374.
152. Gen. Elizabeth Hoisington, Director of the Women's Army Corps and General
Anna Mae Hays, Chief of the Army Nurse Corps. Col. Jeanne M. Holm, Director of
Women in the Air Force, is on the list of nominees for promotion to general.
153. Holm, supra note 149, at 10. It may be noted that "KP" and latrine duty, the
traditional army punishments, are also traditional "women's work."
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discharging expectant fathers) also parallels discriminatory practices of
some private employers. 4
The number of women volunteers allowed in the military is also
limited. For example, the authorized strength of the Women's Army
Corps is prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and is currently limited
to approximately one percent of that of the regular army.155 In 1967,
the President's National Advisory Commission on Selective Service
recommended that opportunities be made available for more women to
serve in the armed forces, thereby reducing the number of men who must
be called involuntarily."'1
Before the end of World War II, consideration was given to draft-
ing women nurses. 5 However, the end of the war in Europe lessened
the need for drafting nurses and the proposal was not pressed. Not all
nurses are women, of course, but there are not enough male nurses to
eliminate the necessity of assigning women nurses to the front. The
Office of Public Affairs, Department of Defense, reports that as of
January 1, 1971, the number of women, including nurses, serving in
Vietnam was a little over 800.
Women are not required to train for or to serve in combat. To the
extent that the exemption of women from combat duty increases the
chances of such duty for men in service, it should be regarded as dis-
criminating against men. However, in upholding the constitutionality
of excluding women from the draft, a federal district court in United
States v. Cook stated that
[w]hile each of the sexes has its own innate characteristics,
for the most part physical strength in a male characteristic, and
so long as this is so, the United States will be compelled to
establish and maintain armed forces of males which may at least
physically be equal to the armed forces of other nations, like-
wise composed of males, with which it must compete.'58
Men as a class have greater muscular strength than women as a class,
but big men as a group are also stronger than little men. Moreover,
private employers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964...
154. Id.
155 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 3215 (Supp. 1970) ; 32 C.F.R. § 580.4 (1970).
156. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON SELECTIVE
SERVICE 11, 16 (1967).
157. H. REP. No. 194, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
158. 311 F. Supp. 618, 622 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
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are not allowed to exclude women from work requiring weight lifting.160
Equal responsibility simply requires that people be treated as individuals
and not classified by sex.
The Senate attached an amendment to the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment in the 91st Congress that would have allowed Congress to
exempt women from military service. 1 In expressing opposition to the
draft exemption rider, the Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of
Women pointed out that there are benefits, as well as disadvantages, in
serving in the armed forces:
The opportunities for education and training afford our young
people advantages for upward mobility instead of being locked
into any particular economic stratum ....
. The young women of this country should not be
denied the opportunity for complete training for the defense
of themselves and their families, and for the preservation of
their homes and their country. " '
A group of young women of draft age also expressed opposition
to the draft exemption rider. George Washington University Women's
Liberation issued a statement during the Senate debate on the amendment
in the 91st Congress:
Sex exemption from the draft is a negation of our ability to face
the most onerous self-determination question of our time. We
are not asking to be spared from making critical decisions. If
the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment means that both
men and women will be subject to involuntary induction, we
claim the right to answer for ourselves.
For long enough we have been given an easy out solely
because we are females. We did not ask for this easy out, and
we will accept it no longer. Neither will we have our credibility
diminished, our need for equal rights demeaned by senators
who seek to deny us this equality with the tactic of fear.'
160. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
161. 116 CONG. Ran. S17895 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1970).
162. Statement on Bayh Substitute and Ervin Amendment to the Equal Right
Amendment, Citizens' Advisory Council Release, October 29, 1970. No amount of private
karate lessons, currently in vogue in the women's movement, can match the training pro-
vided by the military at taxpayers' expense.
163. G.W. [George Washington University] Women's Liberation, The Equal
Rights Amendment and the Draft, Nov. 13, 1970.
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2. Laws That Restrict or Deny Freedom or Opportunities to One Sex:
Rendered Unconstitutional
(a) Prohibitive or restrictive labor laws. Prohibited occupations for
women under state laws are basically of two types: working in mines
or other specified hazardous occupations and bartending' 6 Obviously, no
one can be forced into any occupation, and the nullification of all laws
closing certain work to women would not force or encourage any woman
into any line of work. It would only permit women to make their own
decisions without state interference. Laws prohibiting women from work-
ing in certain jobs are an obvious restriction upon their liberty and would
be rendered void by the Equal Rights Amendment.
Laws in a few states still limit the weights which women can lift."0 5
Such laws violate the rights of women to equal employment opportunity
under Title VII of the Civil Rights .' ct of 1964.166 Irrespective of Title
VII, such laws also limit the freed )m of a woman to choose certain
types of work and would deny women equal rights under the amendment.
It might be argued that weight lifting laws confer a benefit upon
women workers by protecting them from having to lift heavier objects,
and therefore, the "benefit" could be extended to men workers under the
amendment. The amounts of the restrictions range from 10 to 50
pounds.'6 7 If these restrictions were imposed upon men as well as women,
some jobs simply could not be performed. 8 If the law applied to house-
wives, most would have to quit.
The same is true of hours restrictions, still on the books in most of
the states, and laws prohibiting night work by women in certain occupa-
tions.6 9 To extend such restrictions on hours to men workers would
require drastic changes in the operation of most businesses and would
cause an abrupt reduction in national output. A constitutional requirement
of equality of the sexes does not carry with it any correlative requirement
that industry restructure, no matter how desirable that ultimately might
be.
(b) Domicile limitations. One's domicile or legal residence can
determine in which state one may vote, run for public office, serve on
juries, pay taxes or have one's estate administered. The traditional-rule
has been that by operation of law a married woman's legal domicile
164. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 1, at 277-78.
165. Id.
166. See notes.159-60 supra and accompanying text.
167. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 1, at 277-78.
168. See Murray & Eastwood, supra note 5, at 248-53.
169. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 1, at 271.
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automatically is that of her husband and is determined by him regardless
of her intentions or where she lives. In five states married women have
the right to establish their own domicile."' In addition to these five,
three states allow a married woman to establish her own domicile for
purposes of running for public office, two for purposes of jury service,
three for probate purposes and thirteen for voting. 7" The Equal Rights
Amendment would have the effect of removing remaining restrictions
on the freedom of married women to establish their own domicile.
(c) Other restrictions on married women. The Women's Bureau
of the Department of Labor reports that in three states a married woman
does not have the legal capacity to become a surety or a guarantor, 12
and in four states she may not go into business for herself without court
sanction."' These remaining legal disabilities imposed upon married
women would be nullified by the amendment.
3. Laws Making Age Distinctions on the Basis of Sex: Equalize Up or
Down
Different ages specified for men and women or boys and girls in
the same law would be equalized under the Equal Rights Amendment.
Where the two different ages specified in the law are ages at which a
right terminates, the higher age would apply to both sexes. This would
be consistent with the rationale of extending the rights, benefits and
privileges accorded to one sex under the law to the other sex." Where
the ages are those at which limitations or disabilities are terminated, the
limitations are nullified with respect to persons between the two ages
by applying the lower age to both sexes. 75
In a few western states the age at which a child's right to parental
;upport terminates is 18 for girls and 21 for boys. 7" Under such laws,
boys between the ages of 18 and 21 have a right which girls do not have,
and the effect of the amendment would be to extend that right to girls
and make the cut off age 21 for all children.
Similarly, some laws provide the juvenile court jurisdiction may
170. Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii and Wisconsin. CITIZENS' ADvisoRY
COUNCIL OF THE STATUS OF WOMEN, supra note 135, at 44-59; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
WOMEN'S BUaRu, suPra note 1, at 284-85.
171. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 1, at 284-85.
172. Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky. Id. at 292.
173. Id.
174. See notes 125-63 supra and accompanying text.
175. See notes 163-73 supra and accompanying text.
176. The Council of State Governments lists Arkansas, Idaho, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah as having such laws. COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV'TS, supra note 130, at 21-25.
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extend to girls at a higher age than boys.177 Under the amendment the
advantages accorded to one sex would be extended to the other by
applying the higher age of juvenile court jurisdiction to both sexes.
In some states the age at which marriage can be contracted with
parental consent and the age below which parental consent is required
for marriage is higher for boys than for girls. 7" By contrast, some
child labor laws provide a higher age for girls than for boys. The right
to marry'70 and the right to engage in labor' are restricted for persons
between the two ages-boys in the case of marriage and girls in the case
of the child labor laws. The restriction would be removed by the amend-
ment, and the lower age applied in both cases.
4. Laws Which Involve Difference in Sexual or Reproductive Capacity
(a) Maternity. Since men do not bear children, a law which
applies to pregnancy and childbirth and which refers only to women is
not making a sex classification. Despite its terminology, the law would
apply in the same way and have the same effect if it referred to people. 8'
Thus, if a law provided for cash benefits for the birth of a child, it would
not be violative of the Equal Rights Amendment. It is important to note,
however, that special maternity benefits laws are virtually non-existent. 8
If there were such laws, they of course would have to be reasonably
related to the protection of pregnancy and childbirth and not designed
to place women at a competitive disadvantage in the labor force.
The Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women has
adopted the following statement on "Job-Related Maternity Benefits :"
Childbirth and complications of pregnancy are, for all job-
related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as
such under any health insurance, temporary disability insurance,
or sick leave plan of an employer, union, or fraternal society. 8
The Council noted, however, that of the six jurisdictions which have
government-sponsored temporary disability insurance programs, only
New Jersey and Rhode Island require that the benefits under these laws
177. Such a law in Oklahoma was recently upheld as not violative of boys' rights to
equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment. Johnson v. State, 476 P2d
397 (Okla. Crim App. 1970).
178. Steele, supra, note 134, at 403.
179. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
180. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
181. See Murray & Eastwood, supra note 5, at 240.
182. See CITIZENS' AnvIsoRY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON SOCIAL INSURANCE AND TAXES 44-46 (1968).
183. Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Statement of Principles,
Oct. 29, 1970.
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be available for temporary absence from work for a normal delivery.'
The exclusion of childbirth from a state temporary disability in-
surance program is in the nature of a "reverse benefit" or a detriment.
If the special exclusion were reasonably related to discouraging pregnancy
and childbirth (and if that were its true purpose which, of course, it is
not), perhaps it would not be violative of the Equal Rights Amendment.
The reason for the absence from work due to the worker's temporarily
being disabled, whether due to childbrith, injury, surgery or other
temporary physical incapacity, is of no concern to the employment. To
single out absence for the particular reason of childbirth bears no
employment purpose other than to discriminate against certain women
workers. Though superficially neutral in that the law acts to exclude
childbirth and not women, it results in treating some women workers
differently than men workers who are absent from work due to temporary
disability. In the guise of discouraging childbirth, the women are punished
as workers.
Laws prohibiting women from working for certain periods before
and after childbirth... discriminate against women because the true aim
and effect is to regulate the women's employment and not to regulate or
give "benefits" for pregnancy or childbirth. There is no comparable com-
pelled period of absence from work for men who, for example, are
temporarily disabled because of surgery.
In sum, singling out childbirth for special treatment does not dis-
criminate on the basis of sex even though the law refers only to women
because men cannot give birth. But if in referring to childbirth the law
goes beyond to spheres other than the reproductive difference between
men and women (e.g., employment), the law must treat women who
give birth the same as men are treated in respect to the area of regulated
employment (e.g., absence from work for temporary disability).
Similarly, women and girls could not be discriminated against in
pursuing education because of childbirth. The expulsion or segregation
of girls in public schools who have become mothers, but not boys who
have become fathers, would be inconsistent with the Equal Rights
Amendment. Just as laws prohibiting women from working for certain
periods before (or after) childbirth regulate women's employment, not
the childbirth, exclusion of pregnant girls from public schools regulates
their education, not their pregnancy. The reproductive differences in the
184. Id. at 3. See also CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WoIMN,
supra note 182.
185. CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, supra note 182, at
32.
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sexes are not relevant to employment and education and in these areas
men and women must be treated the same.
A criminal abortion statute is an example of a law which is limited
on its face to the reproductive function. As such, it does not involve a
direct question of denial of equality but of denial of other human rights
beyond the scope of this article. It may be noted, however, that the
abortion issue is not unrelated to the equality issue because the same
underlying bases for court decisions denying equality of the sexes
(women as reproductive instruments of the state, as dangerous to
morality, and properly under the control of men) are implicit in the
abortion laws.
(b) Homosexuality. It was suggested at the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee hearings on the Equal Rights Amendment in September, 1970,
that "[i]f the law must be as undiscriminating concerning sex as it is
toward race, it would follow that laws outlawing wedlock between
members of the same sex would be as invalid as laws forbidding mis-
cegenation."' i 6 This is not the case. The amendment would affect only
laws in which the difference in treatment is based on sex and not those
where the difference is based on sexuality. It would not affect laws
distinguishing as between homosexuality and heterosexuality. It would,
however, require that male and female homosexuals be treated the same
and that male and female heterosexuals be treated the same.
Although the issue is not relevant to the amendment, the interest
of the state in recognizing heterosexual marriages is their capacity for
reproduction and child raising. This element is not present in homosexual
relationships. Any challenge to legal distinctions as between heterosexuals
and homosexuals would have to be brought under the fourteenth amend-
ment.
(c) Rape. Forcible rape is sexual intercourse with a female not the
wife of the assailant by force and without her consent. During 1969,
there were approximately 36,470 reported forcible rapes, a rate of 35
for every 100,000 women in the United States. 8 ' The rate has almost
doubled-up 93 percent since 1960.188 According to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, rape "is probably one of the most under reported crimes
due primarily to fear and/or embarassment on the part of the victims."" 9
186. Statement of Paul A. Freund, Hearings on SJ. Res. 61 & 231 Before the Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 74-75 (1970).
187. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS-1969, at 11 (1970).
188. Id. at 12.
189. Id. at 11.
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The F.B.I. crime figures include only actual offenses established by
police investigation.'
A reported study of 100 consecutive rape cases in Dade County,
Florida, showed that 38 of the victims suffered physical injury (only
gross injuries were counted)."' In 58 of the cases, only one male
assailant was involved; in 42 there were from two to ten assailants. 19 2
In 45 of the cases, the assailants were not apprehended. Nineteen were
determined by the police after investigation to be "unfounded." Of the
remaining 36, ten were found guilty of rape or a lesser crime. 9 S
From 1930 to 1968 there were 455 executions for rape.' The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that execution
is a cruel and unusual punishment for all but the most aggravated types
of rape and therefore violative of the eighth amendment.9 5 No useful
purpose is served in punishing rape more severely than other forms of
assault that inflict comparable injury on the victim. The more severe
penalties do not appear to add to the protection of women. The Model
Penal Code treats both rape and aggravated assault as felonies in the
second degree. 9
It has been suggested that rape laws do not classify by sex because
their application would not be any different if the prohibition applied to
persons rather than to men and accordingly would not be constitutionally
objectionable.' 97 This assumes, however, that a woman or women could
not force sexual intercourse on a man without his consent. If that is
possible, then the Equal Rights Amendment would affect rape laws as
follows: A man accused of rape could not be punished more severely
than a woman who performed the same elements of the crime. She would
be prosecuted under other applicable statutes, such as aggravated assault,
kidnapping, maiming or burglary. Thus, in those states where the rape
penalty is more severe than those criminal statutes that could be invoked
to prosecute women who performed such acts upon men, the maximum
190. Id. at 12.
191. Schiff, Statistical Features of Rape, 14 J. FoR. ScI. 102, 106-07 (1960).
192. Id. at 105.
193. Id. at 109.
194. 405 of those convicted were black (398 in the South and 7 in Missouri). U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1930-1968, at 10-11 (1969).
195. Ralph v. Warden, 8 Crim. L. Rptr. 2193 (4th Cir. 1970).
196. MODEL PENAL CobE §§ 211.1, 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
197. Murray & Eastwood, supra note 5, at 240. It was thought that the specifica-
tion of a female victim in the law would make it impossible for a woman to commit rape.
However, the essence of the statute is to prohibit forcible heterosexual attack (un-
less the particular law also applies to homosexual attacks). Focusing attention on the
victim's gender seems too easy an out, and equal justice would seem to prohibit such a
narrow and literal disposition of the question.
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rape penalty would be reduced to the level of that in the applicable
non-rape criminal statute. This would accomplish equal treatment of men
and women accused of the same elements of the crime. What the crime
is called does not matter.
The elements in the crime of statutory rape, sexual intercourse with
a girl under a certain age not the wife of the assailant, would be com-
parable to those involved in seduction by a woman of a boy under the
same age. The law assumes that children do not have capacity to consent;
absence of consent is not part of such crimes. Unlike forcible rape, where
other criminal statutes would apply even if the rape laws were repealed,
if the statutory rape statute does not apply to both men and women and
there is no statute applicable to women involving the same criminal
elements,19 the legislature would have to amend the law to apply to
women or the state could punish the rape only if it were forcible. The
net effect if the law were not amended, therefore, would be to remove the
presumption in the law that a girl under the specified age (the range is
14 to 21 )19" is incapable of consenting to intercourse.
(d) Prostitution. As a matter of morality there probably should be
no difference in treatment under the law as between a prostitute and her
customer, but laws punishing prostitution generally punish only the
woman.2"' The receipt of payment for sexual services, however, differs
from giving payment; therefore, the prostitute and her customer are
not comparable. The customer does not violate the same law as the
prostitute because one element of the crime is not present, and accordingly,
equal treatment of prostitute and customer would not be required by
the Equal Rights Amendment. However, since it is possible for a man
to sell his sexual services to a woman, as in the case of statutory rape,
the appropriate legislative bodies would have to amend the law to apply
to both sexes or women could no longer be punished for prostitution.2"'
5. Separation of the Sexes: Forbidden Except Where Necessary to
Protect the Right to Privacy and Does Not Deny Individual Rights and
Liberties
The Citizens' Advisory Council Memorandum on the Equal Rights
Amendment"2 states that legally required separation of the sexes, to be
198. Kanowitz states that only a few states provide penalties for a woman who
engages in sexual intercourse with a young boy. Kanowitz, Law and the Single Girl, 11
ST. Louis U.L.J. 293, 312 (1967).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 310.
201. The propriety of punishing prostitution perhaps needs to be reassessed.
202. CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, THE PROPOSED
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consistent with the amendment, must meet two requirements: 1) the
separation must not deny individual rights and liberties and 2) the
government must show that the reason for the separation is to protect
the right of privacy."' 3
Whether the generally unnatural and artificial condition of sex
segregation is consistent with equal rights depends, in part, upon whether
separate can be equal. In addition to the few remaining sex segregated
systems of public higher education," 4 some public schools in the South
have segregated by sex in connection with racial desegregation plans.' 05
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that "in the
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place."' The Court's reasoning in Brown regarding the effect of separate
educational facilities on Negro children is equally applicable with respect
to the effect sex separation has upon girls:
To separate them from others of similar age and qualification
solely because of their race [sex] generates a feeling of in-
feriority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."'
In addition, sex separation reinforces artificial, exaggerated and mean-
ingless disctinctions between the sexes that further stereotype and limit
both sexes.
It has been suggested that
[t]he constitutional right of privacy would prevail over other
portions of the Constitution embodying the laws of the society
in its collective capacity.
[ .. T] he right of privacy would permit, perhaps require,
separation of the sexes in public restrooms, segregation by sex
in sleeping quarters of prisons or similar public institutions,
and a certain segregation of living conditions in the Armed
Forces."'8
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: A MEMORANDUM
14 (1970).
203. Although the Council Memorandum does not state that the right to privacy is
the exclusive potentially acceptable reason for separation, no other is mentioned nor has
any other been suggested by women who support the amendment.
204. For example, Virginia and South Carolina. See note 62 supra and accompany-
ing text.
205. See Barnett, The Constitutionality of Sex Separation in School Desegration
Plans, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 296, 297 (1970).
206. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
207. Id. at 494.
208. Statement of Thomas I. Emerson, Hearings on SJ. Res. 61 & 231, supra note
186, at 298. -1
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Presumably, individual privacy is affected more in these situations where
the sexes are mixed than where all are of the same sex because of greater
heterosexual interest and therefore greater invasion of the right to be
left alone. While these particular examples do not appear to present
problems, there is danger that the right of privacy, if used to justify
segregation of the sexes, would be the new technique for discriminating
against women.
Privacy is inherently individual and not class oriented. Just as the
right of an individual to be protected by government from harm may not
be used to justify class discrimination,"' the individual right of privacy
should not justify governmentally enforced segregation where the separa-
tion affects the individual's right to equal treatment without differentia-
tion by reason of sex. In other words, the rule should be that government
has an obligation to construct its facilities so that integration of the sexes
does not cause invasion of individual privacy, not that government can
segregate the sexes if necessary to avoid invasion of privacy. Thus, in
constructing university dormitories, protecting privacy by segregating
sleeping quarters and bathrooms does not warrant segregating students
in facilities for eating, studying and social activities. The desired goal is
to construct facilities to protect individual privacy from interference by
anyone, regardless of sex.
CONCLUSION
The Equal Rights Amendment would not change the law. It would
only require equality. Whether the amendment is literally added to the
Constitution or read into existing provisions through interpretation,
courts must no longer base approval of sex distinctions in the law on
the "woman's place is in the home" or any variant of that assumption.
Nor should the law make any distinction as between persons based on
their class by birth.
Finally, who can speak for women, many of whom are too satisfied
and/or oppressed to make their views known? Certainly not men, and
certainly not the "authorities"-judges, legislators, lawyers, doctors,
psychiatrists, writers, sociologists-regardless of their sex. This does not
mean that every issue is "up for grabs" with the "degree" of equality
decided by the loudest or most prestigious. The power of an individual
to give up the right to equal treatment under the law is non-delegable.
209. "[I]rmportant as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be
accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the
Federal Constitution." Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917). See also Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
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